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Abstract
Firms in socialist and transitional economies are often obliged to
provide a social good in addition to a private good, which makes it
diﬃcult for a government to commit not to bail out the ﬁrm once it
is in ﬁnancial trouble. This creates a soft budget constraint syndrome
which causes the ﬁrm to underinvest ex ante in order to extract state
subsidy and thereby reduces dynamic eﬃciency. In this paper, we
show that separating the provision of social goods from private goods
can harden budget constraints, while introducing competition into the
private market may not.
11 Introduction
Enterprises in socialist and transitional economies are often mandated by
their governments to provide some social goods in addition to producing
a private good.1 These social goods include retraining redundant workers,
providing housing, kindergartens, pensions and medical beneﬁts to work-
ers, etc. For example, SOEs (state owned enterprises) in China, have been
mandated to provide so-called LIW (labor insurance and welfare) beneﬁts
to their active and retired workers which cover pensions, medical care and
other beneﬁts (see Table 1). In 1993, the LIW cost Chinese enterprises an
estimated US$17 billion, which accounted for 34% of their total wage bill.
Before the recent economic reforms, the social good obligation did not im-
pose any extra burden on the SOEs because the state covered all the SOE
expenditures. However, as part of the economic reform, SOEs have become
responsible for payment of wages, medical care and pensions of their active
and retired workers. Facing competition from enterprises which provide lit-
tle or no social goods, the obligation to provide social goods has become a
huge burden for Chinese SOEs and considerably undermined their ability to
stay viable. It is estimated that over 50% of all Chinese SOEs were losing
money in 1993. As a consequence of these developments, these loss-making
SOEs attempt to bargain with the government for subsidies on the grounds
that they were unable to meet their LIW obligations. Indeed it was concern
about possible SOEs failure to maintain redundant workers and provide med-
ical care and pensions that has prompted the government to grant subsidies
to ﬁnancially distressed SOEs (Hu 1997). In 1993, subsidies for loss-making
SOEs amounted to some US$5 billion, which adds up to an incredible 9% of
total government expenditure. These subsidies, in theory, should only cover
the SOE losses from the social obligations. However, due to the information-
asymmetry problem, it is very diﬃcult for the state to distinguish between
these losses from the operational losses and consequently, the state in prac-
tice has to be responsible for all the SOE losses and the budget constraints
of SOE’s become soft (Lin, Cai and Li 1998).
This kind of mandatory bundling of social goods with private goods is not
1Social good is deﬁned as a good with a positive externality which must be provided or
subsidized by government if it is to be produced by a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm. Universal
service, kindergardens, unemployment beneﬁts, pension and medical cares are some of the
examples.
2immune to market economies. Firms in network industries have been oblig-
ated to provide so-called universal service in addition to other services.2 In
fact, universal service obligation and natural monopoly arguments were com-
monly used to justify public and/or monopolistic control of certain network
industries. Before the recent liberalization of many European network indus-
tries, there was less competition and ﬁrms might be able to cover their losses
from universal service obligation by cross-subsidizing. However, as liberal-
ization introduced more competition, the ability of ﬁrms to cross-subsidize
is undermined.
The introduction of competition in the private goods market puts govern-
ment into a diﬃcult situation. In principle, there are two possible alterna-
tives: either ﬁrms are required to continue the provision of the social good
c o u p l e dw i t has u b s i d yt ok e e pﬁrms viable, or a separation of the provision
of social and private good is undertaken. This paper studies this trade-oﬀ.
As we will show, the ﬁrst scenario will give rise to a soft budget constraint
syndrome, which dilutes the ﬁrms incentive to invest and thereby reduces
dynamic eﬃciency.
Imagine an economy consisting of a politician and two ﬁrms. The politician is
a self-interested economic agent who derives political beneﬁto u to ft h ep r o v i -
sion of the social good. Firms are competing in the private good market. One
of the ﬁrms (so-called multiproduct ﬁrm) is required by the politician to pro-
vide a social good in addition to the private good. The provision of the social
good involves loss making. In addition to their production decisions, ﬁrms
can invest into becoming more eﬃcient. To make the problem interesting we
assume that the ﬁrm who produces both the social good and the private good
can stay in business only if it undertakes some investment to reduce its cost.3
Whenever the ﬁrm underinvests (and is consequently in ﬁnancial trouble),
it bargains with the politician for a subsidy. The politician concerns about
the provision of the social good and thereby concerns about the ﬁrm’s via-
2The objective of universal service obligations is to make sure that everyone, including
uneconomic customers in uneconomic areas, have access to certain essential services of
high quality at prices they can aﬀord (European Commision 1998).
3If the ﬁrm is viable without investing there would be no soft-budget constrain problem
and the ﬁrm would always have an incentive to become eﬃcient. In eﬀect that would be
the situation whenever the monopoly rents are large enought to cover the loss from the
provision of the social good, i.e. this can be thought of as the situation before competition
is introduced.
3bility, allow the ﬁrm to extract a subsidy by credibly threaten to shut down.
The ﬁrm, therefore, deliberately underinvests ex-ante, giving rise to the SBC
problem. When this happens, dynamic eﬃciency is undermined, consumers
are worse oﬀ due to the higher price from both the underinvestment and
softer competition in the private good market. However, the politician is
better oﬀ.
Given the existence of a SBC syndrome for multiproduct ﬁrm, we next study
how to harden the budget constraint. One way is to separate the provision
of social good from private good, in other words the social goods is provided
by a ﬁrm or government agency who specializes in supplying social goods.
When the provision of social good is detached from the provision of private
good, the multiproduct ﬁrm can no longer use its shutdown as a credible
threat and the SBC problem is eliminated. Facing competition in the private
good market, the ﬁrm will now have an incentive to become eﬃcient in the
provision of the private good. This ﬁnding suggests that the eﬃciency of
ﬁrms in the private sector crucially depends on the separation of social and
private provision. Note that this result does not depend on any exogenous
cost ineﬃciency that a multiproduct ﬁrm might have. Rather we show that
there are endogenous diseconomies of scope due to an incentive problem of a
multiproduct ﬁrm.
Another possibility for hardening the SBC might be to increase competi-
tion. As we mention above, the SBC problem only emerges when the cross-
subsidization does not cover the loss from the provision of social goods.
Moreover, as we show in this paper, increasing competition in the private
good market may even worsen the SBC problem. Increasing competition in
the private good market reduces the multiproduct ﬁrm’s proﬁt, which makes
it more likely to use shutdown as a credible threat and to receive a subsidy,
further softening its budget constraint.
Our analysis suggests that social obligations, especially those involved loss-
making, should be detached from the enterprises. As long as the social
obligations remain, the politician always has incentive to subsidize the ﬁrm,
and the SBC problem will persist. This not only weakens the enterprises’
incentive to become eﬃcient and undermine their ability to restructure, but
also impose losses on consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we give related
4literature. In Section 3, we provide a basic set-up. In Section 4, we investigate
how the provision of social good induces the SBC syndrome, and the impact
of an increase in competition. In Section 5, we study means to harden budget
constraints and analyze the economic consequences from the SBC syndrome.
Section 6 gives conclusion and comments.
2 Related Literature
Soft budget constraint (SBC hereafter) is a term coined by Kornai (1979) as
a phenomenon that a funding source can not commit to keep an enterprise
to a ﬁxed budget, i.e., the enterprise ﬁnds its budget constraint ”softened”
by the infusion of additional subsidy or credit when it is in ﬁnancial trouble.
According to Kornai (1998), there are exogenous and endogenous explana-
tions for the SBC phenomenon. The exogenous explanation ascribes the
SBC mainly to political factors such as the politicians’ aim to gain political
support, the paternalism and the egalitarianism of the state, etc. The other
explanation views the SBC arising endogenously from a time inconsistency
problem.4 D e w a t r i p o n ta n dM a s k i n( 1 9 9 5 )s h o wt h a tt h eS B Cc a na r i s ef r o m
the creditor’s inability to commit not to reﬁnance the bad project ex ante
since marginal beneﬁto fr e ﬁnancing the bad project exceeds marginal cost
of abandoning it. This time inconsistency problem lies at the heart of many
other theoretical investigations (see for example, Qian and Roland (1998),
Qian and Xu (1998), Schaﬀer (1989)).
The exogenous political factors and the time inconsistency problem often
act together to induce the SBC problem. Segal (1998) shows the SBC phe-
nomenon may arise from a benevolent government’s decision to subsidize a
unproﬁtable monopoly since the social damage of shutting down the ﬁrm
exceeds the social cost of bailout. Schmidt (1996) demonstrates that the
public ownership may cause a benevolent government to subsidize a failing
ﬁrm and gives rise to the SBC problem. These two papers, however, impose
a strong assumption on the role of the government. Namely, the government
is a benevolent, fully rational social-welfare maximizer. In particular, there
4Ad i ﬀerent explanation is oﬀered by Lin and Tan (1998). They attribute the SBC to
the state’s accountability problem.
5are no self-interested politicians. In contrast to Segal (1998) and Schmidt
(1996), our government is modeled as a self-interested politician who seeks
political gain. In both socialist and capitalist regimes, anecdotal evidence
suggests that politicians often use their political power to force ﬁrms to pro-
duce services and goods which are beneﬁcial to them (Shleifer 1998). In a
totalitarian political system, the politicians’ main concern is social stability.
Keeping redundant workers oﬀ the street or supplying medical and pension
beneﬁts to active and retired workers certainly helps to reduce the chance
of social unrest. On the other hand, in a democratic political system, the
politicians’ goal is to remain in oﬃce. Transferring wealth to certain groups
of society through social goods such as universal service may gain political
support for politicians and increase their chance to be elected.5 For this rea-
son we model the politician as someone who cares about the provision of the
social good.
A malnevolent politician has been modeled by Shleifer and Vishny (1994),
in which the relationship between a self-interested politician and a ﬁrm is
governed by incomplete contracts and the control right of the ﬁrm decides
the direction of bribe ﬂows between the politician and the ﬁrm. By contrast,
we model the relationship between the politician and the ﬁrm through the
social good obligation and focus on the ﬁrms ability to make its shut-down
threat credible through underinvesting ex ante, in order to extract a subsidy.
I na d d i t i o nt ot h eo t h e rp a p e r sm e n t i o n e da b o v e ,w ei n v e s t i g a t ew a y si n
which the SBC problem is eliminated within the a multiproduct context.
The recent overviews of theoretical and empirical SBC literature are given
in Kornai, Maskin and Roland (2002), Kornai (2001) and Dewatripont and
Roland (2000). The SBC syndrome in transitional economies are investigated
b yM a s k i na n dX u( 2 0 0 1 ) ,L i na n dT a n( 1 9 9 9 )a n dS c h a ﬀer (1998). In this
paper we explore how the mandate to provide social goods, as in both market
and transitional economies, gives rise to SBC problem. This problem can be
even worsened by the introduction of market competition.
5The univeral serivce obligation may be the outcome of a political process or result
from regulatory capture by some pressure groups and they are not necessarily motivate
by social welfare considerations (European Commision 1998).
63M o d e l
In this section, we develop a model characterizing the game between a politi-
cian and two ﬁrms. The politician is a self-interested economic agent aiming
to maximize his utility. One of the ﬁrms (the multiproduct ﬁrm) is obliged to
provide a social good in addition to a private good. The multiproduct ﬁrm
is competing with the other ﬁrm in the private good market. Firms can un-
dertake some investment to reduce their costs. The structure of the game is
as follow: at the ﬁrst stage, the politician sets the amount of social good. At
stage 2, ﬁrms choose their cost-reduction investments noncooperatively. At
stage 3, the ﬁrms and the politician bargain over the magnitude of subsidy.
At stage 4, producing ﬁr m sc o m p e t ei nt h ep r i v a t eg o o dm a r k e t .
The politician derives political beneﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrm’s provision of social good.
In a totalitarian political regime, providing social protections to workers and
keeping redundant workers oﬀ the street help to reduce the chance of social
unrest, beneﬁting the politician. In a democratic political regime, universal
service may be used by the politician to transfer wealth to certain groups of
society and gain political support. Let qO (subscript O forsocial good) denote
the quantity of social good and R(qO) denote the politician’s beneﬁtf r o m
the provision of qO.T h e ﬁrm uses its social good obligation to bargain for
subsidy when it is in ﬁnancial trouble. The cost to the politician to provide
subsidy s is given by N(s). This cost can be interpreted as the political cost
of rasing taxes to ﬁnance the subsidy. The politician’s utility function is thus
given by
R(qO)−N(s); where R(0) = N(0) = 0,R 0(·) > 0,N 0(·) > 0,R 00(·) < 0,
N00(·) > 0.
There are two ﬁrms: ﬁrm 1 and ﬁr m2 .F i r m2i so b l i g e dt op r o d u c eas o c i a l
good in addition to a private good. Firm 1 produces only the private good.
These two ﬁrms compete in the private good market.
Cost function of ﬁrm 1 is given by c1q1, where c1 is constant.
Cost function of ﬁrm 2 is given by c2q2+cOqO, where c2 and cO are constant.
7That is, the production cost of ﬁrm 2 consists of two parts: the cost of
producing private good, c2q2, and the cost of producing social good, cOqO.
There are two markets, A (private good market) and O (social good market).
Demand in market A is given by
pA(QA),Q A = q1 + q2 is the total output of the private good.
Demand in market O is given by
pO(qO),w h e r eqO is the quantity of social good.
In addition, each ﬁrm can undertake some investment xi to reduce its mar-
ginal cost of producing the private good. The cost of investment is given
by
I(xi),w h e r e0 ≤ xi ≤ Xi ,i =1 ,2. I(0) = 0, I0(·) > 0, I00(·) > 0,
reﬂecting diminishing return to the investment.
Firm 1’s proﬁt function is then,
π1(x1,x 2,q 1,q 2)=( pA − c1 + x1)q1 − I(x1).
Firm 2’s proﬁt function (net of subsidy) is given by
π2(x1,x 2,q 1,q 2,q O)=( pA − c2 + x2)q2 − I(x2)+( pO − cO)qO.
Firm 1 aims to maximize π1(·). Firm 2 maximizes (π2(·)+s). The politician
chooses the amount of social good qO to maximize (R(qO) − N(s)),w h e r e
0 ≤ qO ≤ qO and pO( qO)=0 . That is, as long as the multiproduct ﬁrm is
producing the private good, it is obliged to provide social good.
The politician and ﬁrm 2 bargain over the amount of subsidy. The bargaining




(R(qO) − N(s))(π2 + s);
8where Ω = {(R(qO) − N(s),π2 + s) | 0 ≤ s ≤ s , s = N−1(R(qO ))} is the
feasible agreement set, which is compact and convex.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: p0
A < 0 and p00
AQA +2 p0
A < 0. In addition, p0
O < 0 .
This assumption is simply to ensure the existence and stability of a unique
solution to ﬁrms’ maximization problems.
Assumption 2: The production of social good is loss-making. That is,
(pO − cO)qO ≤ 0.
Assumption 3: π2(X1,0,qO) < 0 but π2(X1,X 2,qO) > 0,w h e r e
pO( qO)=0 .
This assumption says that the multiproduct ﬁrm is making a loss without
investment but can stay viable if it undertakes full investment, given that
the rival ﬁrm invests in the full amount.
Assumption 4:
∂πi(·)
∂xi > 0 and
∂πj(·)
∂xj < 0 for i 6= j, i,j =1 ,2.
This assumption says that a ﬁrm’s investment raises its proﬁt but reduces
its rival’s proﬁts.
4 The SBC phenomenon
4.1 The Provision of Social Goods and the SBC syn-
drome
In contrast to Schmidt (1996) and Segal (1996), we model the SBC syndrome
arising from a time inconsistency problem of a self-interested politician in-
stead of a benevolent government. The introduction of competition in the
9p r i v a t eg o o d sm a r k e tp u t sg o v e r n m e n ti n t oad i ﬃcult situation. In principle,
there are two alternatives: either the ﬁrm continues to provide the social
good and receives subsidies from the government, or a separation of the pro-
vision of social good from private good is undertaken. In this section, we
investigates the eﬀect of the ﬁrst scenario. The game between the politician
and the ﬁrms can be described as follows:
Game 1.
Stage 1. The politician sets the amount of social good.
Stage 2. Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2 make their cost-reduction investment decisions
non-cooperatively.
Stage 3. The ﬁrms bargain with the politician over the size of subsidy. If
ﬁrms receive the subsidy, they produce. Otherwise, they decide to produce
or not.
Stage 4. Producing ﬁrms compete in private good market via Cournot.
We solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
The following Lemma 1 describe the equilibrium behavior of ﬁrms at stage
4.
Lemma 1: For any given (x1,x 2), there exists a unique equilibrium at Stage
4, q∗
1(x1,x 2) > 0 and q∗











Proof: By Assumption 3, any ﬁrm who did not produce would be better oﬀ
by investing at full amount X and producing. The rest of proof follows from
Assumption 1.
We now turn to the investment incentive of ﬁrm 1.
Lemma 2: At the subgame perfect equilibrium, ﬁr m1a l w a y su n d e r t a k e sf u l l
investment regardless of ﬁrm 2’s investment decision. In addition, ﬁrm 1
gets no subsidy.
10Proof: Since ﬁrm 1 does not provide the social good, it can not use its
shutdown as a credible threat in order to extract subsidy. Anticipating this,
facing the competition from ﬁrm 2 in private good market, it will invest in
full amount by Assumption 4.
Denote x0
2 as ﬁrm 2’s break even level of investment when ﬁrm 1 providing
the maximum amount of social good. That is, π2(X1,x 0
2,qO)=0 . From
assumption 3, we know that 0 <x 0
2 <X 2. Additionally, denote s∗ = s∗(qO)
as the equilibrium amount of subsidy when SBC syndrome occurs.
Now we are ready to investigate how ﬁrm 2’s obligation to supply the social
good together with the time inconsistency problem create the SBC syndrome.
Proposition 1: The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of Game 1 is as
follows:
a. If π2(X1,X 2,qO) <s ∗(qO),t h e n ﬁrm 2 invests x0
2 (x0
2 <X 2), receives
subsidy s∗,p r o v i d eqO of social good and produces q∗
2(X1,x 0
2) of private good.




b. If π2(X1,X 2,qO) >s ∗(qO),t h e n ﬁrm 2 invests X2, receives no subsidy,
provide qo of social good and produces q∗
2(X1,X 2) of private good. Firm 1
invests X1, receives no subsidy and produces q∗
1(X1,X 2) of private good.
c. If π2(X1,X 2,qO)=s∗(qO), then both a and b forms equilibrium outcome.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 says that when π2(X1,X 2,qO) <s ∗(qO), i.e. when the multi-
product ﬁrm’s proﬁt under full investment is lower than the subsidy it re-
ceives when it underinvests, it will choose to underinvest and thereby create
the SBC problem. The intuition behind this proposition 1 is straightforward.
The social good obligation makes ﬁrm’s threat not to produce become cred-
ible since its shutdown means that the social good is not provided, to the
harm of the politician. The ﬁrm thereby deliberately underinvests ex ante
to become unproﬁtable in order to extract subsidy. This softens the ﬁrm’s
budget constraint and gives rise to the SBC syndrome.
11The following corollary describes the impact of increasing competition on the
likelihood that SBC syndrome occurs.
Corollary 1: The higher degree of competition in the private good market, the
more likely the SBC phenomenon arises.
Increasing competition in the private good market reduces price and lowers
the multiproduct ﬁrm’s proﬁt, which raises the chance of ﬁrm 2 using its
shut-down as a credible threat, further softening the budget constraint.
This suggests that by simply introducing competition is not going to solve
the problems of loss-making state-owned monopolists. As long as policy bur-
dens such as pensions and universal services are imposed on these enterprises,
they are in a very good position to bargain with their governments for subsi-
dies, and thereby have no incentive to cut production costs to become more
eﬃcient and competitive.
Moreover, the correlation between the size of the social good and the likeli-
hood that the SBC occurs can also be drawn from Proposition 1. From the




2N0+N00s∗ > 0. This is illustrated in Corollary 2.
C o r o l l a r y2 : T h eb i g g e rs i z et h es o c i a lg o o dh a s ,t h em o r el i k et h eS B C
syndrome occurs.
This may explain why the SBC syndrome is much more widespread and
prevalent in socialist economies than in market economies . Enterprises in
socialist economies were obliged to provide a much wider range of social
goods than enterprises in market economies.
4.2 Harden Budget Constraint
In this section, we investigate means to eliminate the SBC syndrome. We
propose to separate the provision of social good from private good. After the
separation, ﬁrm 2 only produces the private good and can no longer use its
shutdown as a credible threat so as to extract subsidy.
12Suppose the social good is now supplied by a government agency who only
specializes in the provision of a social good.
The proﬁt functions of ﬁrms are given as follows, respectively:
Firm 1’s proﬁt function is:
π1(x1,x 2)=( pA − c1 + x1)q1 − I(x1).
Firm 2’s proﬁt function is:
π2(x1,x 2)=( pA − c2 + x2)q2 − I(x2).
The government agency’s proﬁt function (net of subsidy) is:
πG(qO)=( pO − cO)qO.
The politician chooses the amount of social good qO (0 ≤ qO ≤ qO ) to
maximize (R(qO) − N(s)).
The bargaining problem between the politician and the government agency
is characterized by the Nash bargaining solution, which is given by
argmax
s∈Ω
(R(qo) − N(s))(πG + s)
Where Ω = {(R(qo) − N(s),πG + s) | 0 ≤ s ≤ s,s = N−1(R(qO ))} is the
feasible agreement set, which is compact and convex.
After the provision of social good is separated from the provision of private
good, ﬁrm 2 does not provide the social good and can not use its shutdown
as a credible threat. Facing the competition from each other in private good
market, they will invest in full amount by Assumption 4.
T h eg a m eb e t w e e nt h ep o l i t i c i a na n dt h eg o v e r n m e n ta g e n c yi sa sf o l l o w s :
Game 2.
Stage 1. The politician sets the size of social good.
Stage 2. Firm 1 and ﬁrm 2 make their cost-reduction investment decisions
non-cooperatively.
13Stage 3. The government agency bargains with the politician for the subsidy.
If the government agency receives the subsidy, it provides the social good.
Otherwise, it decides to produce or not.
Stage 4. Firm 1 and 2 compete in private good market and the government
agency produces the social good.
Denote q∗
1(x1,x 2) and q∗
2(x1,x 2) as the equilibrium output of ﬁr m1a n d2a t
stage 4, the following proposition says that separating the provision of social
good from private good will eliminates the SBC problem.
Proposition 2: The subgame perfect equilibrium of Game 2 is given as follow:6
The government agency produces q∗
OG of social good and receives subsidy s∗
G,
where 0 <q ∗
OG < qO.
Firm 1 and 2 receive no subsidies, invest full amount X1 and X2, respectively,
and produce q∗
1(X1,X 2) and q∗
2(X1,X 2) of private good, respectively.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is, the government agency gets the subsidy and provides the social
good. On the other hand, the ﬁrms who produce in the private good market
invest the full amount and consequently the SBC problem is eliminated.
5 The economic consequences of the SBC Prob-
lem
From the above analysis, we know that bundling the provision of social good
with private good may prevent the multiproduct ﬁrm from becoming eﬃcient
and reduce the dynamic eﬃciency. The other economic consequences caused
by the SBC syndrome are discussed in this section.
6If the government agency is a non-proﬁt organization, then s∗




14Proposition 3: The politician is better oﬀ from bundling the provision of
social and private good.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is to say, the politician beneﬁts from forcing the ﬁrm to provide the
social good in addition to the private good. This is because when the social
good is supplied by the multiproduct ﬁrm, the loss in the provision of social
good is partially cross-subsidized by the ﬁrm’s proﬁti nt h ep r i v a t eg o o d
market, which increases the amount of social good provided, i.e. q∗
OG < qO.
Therefore, it is always in the politician’s interest not to separate the provision
of social good from private good.
Corollary 3 : Consumers in the private good market are worse oﬀ while the
recipients of social good are better oﬀ from bundling the provision of social
and private good.
When the SBC syndrome occurs, the multiproduct ﬁrm underinvests in order
to extract the subsidy. This reduces the competition and raises the price of
private good, harming the consumers. However, the recipients of social good
gain from the higher amount of social good provided.
Corollary 4. Firm 1 beneﬁts when the SBC syndrome arises. Firm 2 (the
multiproduct ﬁr m )i sw o r s eo ﬀ from bundling unless the size of the social
good is suﬃciently large.
Firm 1 is better oﬀ from the reduced competition in the private good market
due to ﬁrm 2’s underinvestment. This ﬁnding is rather surprising at the ﬁrst
glance. During the liberalization of network industries, it is often argued
that granting subsidy to the multiproduct ﬁrm (often the incumbent ﬁrm) to
ensure the provision of social good creates disadvantages to the competing
ﬁrm (often the entrant). However, from a dynamic point of view, anticipating
to be bailed out when it is in ﬁnancial trouble causes the incumbent to
underinvest in order to exact subsidy and consequently, it becomes a ”softer”
competitor, to the beneﬁt of the entrant.
On the other hand, if the size of the social good is small, the amount of
subsidy received by ﬁrm 2 is low. And ﬁrm 2 is worse oﬀ from bundling the
provision of social and private good.
15The policy implication can be drawn from the above analysis is that detach-
ing the provision of social good from private good is important to help the
enterprises in transitional economies become eﬃcient. As long as the enter-
prises continue to provide the social good, the SBC syndrome will persist.
This not only weakens the enterprises’ incentive to become eﬃcient and un-
dermine their ability to restructure, but also imposes losses on consumers.
Increasing competition may deteriorate the SBC syndrome and magnify its
negative economic consequences if the separation of social good from the
private good is not undertaken. This suggests that policy burdens such as
pensions and medical cares in transitional economies and universal service
in market economies should be provided by a government agency or a ﬁrm
who specializes in supplying it. Separating the provision of social goods and
services from private ones will eliminate the SBC problem and help to detain
the beneﬁts from competition and liberalization.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the politician’s personal beneﬁt
from bundling the provision of social good and private good makes the ﬁrm
be able to use its shutdown as a credible threat and extracts ex post a bigger
subsidy than would have been considered eﬃcient ex ante, giving rise to the
SBC syndrome. Consequently, ﬁrm’s dynamic eﬃciency is reduced and its
competitiveness is undermined. Consumers in the private good market are
worse oﬀ while the recipients of social good are better oﬀ.
Also, we have shown that increasing competition in the private good market
may deteriorate the SBC problem and worsen its negative economic conse-
quences, unless the provision of social good and private good is separated.
After the separation, the ﬁrm only produces the private good and its threat
to shutdown is nulliﬁed facing the competition from the other ﬁrm, it will
invests in full amount to reduce its cost, hardening the budget constraint.
This suggests that the eﬃciency of a multiproduct ﬁrm in the private sec-
tor crucially depends on the separation of social and private provision. The
bundling provision of social and private good results in endogenous disec-
onomies of scope due to an incentive problem of the multiproduct ﬁrm.
16Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :We solve Game 1 by backward induction.





At stage 3, the politician and the ﬁr m sb a r g a i no v e rt h es i z eo fs u b s i d y .F i r m
1 receives no subsidy from Lemma 2. For ﬁrm 2, there are two cases:
Case 1: Firm 2’s threat not to produce is credible only if π2(X1,x 2,q O) ≤ 0,
which is equivalent to x2 ≤ x0
2(qO) since π2(X1,x 2,q O) is monotonically
increasing in x2. The optimal amount of subsidy received by ﬁrm 2, s∗ =
s∗(X1,x 2,q O) satisﬁes that
−N0( s∗)(π2 + s∗)+( R(qO) − N(s∗)) = 0. (1)
In this case, the payoﬀ of ﬁrm 2 is π2(X1,x 2,q O)+s∗(X1,x 2,q O).
Case 2: Firm 2’s threat to shut-down is not credible if π2(X1,x 2,q O) ≥ 0,
which is equivalent to x2 ≥ x0
2(qO). In this case, the politician simply opti-
mally chooses s∗ =0since −N0(s) < 0. The payoﬀ of ﬁrm 2 is π2(X1,x 2,q O).
At stage 2, ﬁrms choose their cost-reduction investments non-cooperatively.
From Lemma 2, ﬁrm 1 will optimally choose x1 = X1. For ﬁrm 2, there are
two cases:
Case 1: since (π2(X1,x 2,q O)+s∗(X1,x 2,q O)) is monotonically increasing in
x2, ﬁrm 2 will optimally invest x2 = x0
2(qO) and its payoﬀ is simply s∗.7
Case 2: since π2(X1,x 2,q O) is monotonically increasing in x2, ﬁrm 2 will
optimally invest x2 = X2 and gets π2(X1,X 2,q O).
At stage 1, the politician chooses the amount of social good to maximize
its utility, (R(qO) − N(s∗)). In both cases, the politician optimally chooses











0(s∗) > 0 for any x2 ≤ x0
2(qO).
17the maximum amount of social good qO = qO . This is because in Case 1,
R0(q∗
O) − N0(s∗) ds∗
dq∗
O > 0.8 And in Case 2, R0(qO) > 0. Therefore, ﬁrm 2’s
payoﬀ is s∗
2(X1,x 0
2,qO) in Case 1 and π2(X1,X 2,qO) in Case 2.
The rest of the proof is straightforward by comparing ﬁrm 2’s payoﬀ in two
cases. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :
At stage 4, ﬁrm 1 and 2’s quantity of the private good is given, respectively,
by
qA∗
1 (x1,x 2),q A∗
2 (x1,x 2).
At stage 3, the politician and the government agency bargain over the size
of subsidy. Since the provision of social good always involves loss, i.e.
πG(qO) ≤ 0, the government agency’s threat to shut down is always credible.
Therefore, The optimal amount of subsidy, s∗





G)) = 0. (2)
At stage 2, ﬁr m1a n d2c h o o s ef u l li n v e s t m e n tX1 and X2, respectively.
At stage 1, the politician selects the amount of social good to maximize
(R(qO) − N(s∗
G)).
That is, the politician optimally chooses the amount of social good qO = q∗
OG,
where q∗















OG)) ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3: From the proof of Proposition 2, we have that














10It is trivial that 0 <q ∗
OG < qO
18q∗
OG < qO.T h u s , (R(qO) − N(s∗)) − (R(q∗
OG) − N(s∗
G)) > 0 if s∗ <s ∗
G.I n




G)) = N0( s∗)s∗−N0( s∗
G)(πG + s∗
G),w h i c hi s
greater than zero if s∗ >s ∗
G.T h e r e f o r e , (R(qO)−N(s∗))−(R(q∗
OG)−N(s∗
G))
> 0. That is, the politician is always better oﬀ from bundling the provision
of social good and private good. Q.E.D.
19Table 1: Labor Insurance and Welfare Expenditures by sector, 1978-93 (yuan
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